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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN
PHARMACEUTICALS, BIOLOGICS, AND
MEDICAL DEVICES: PRESENT AND FUTURE
REGULATORY MODELS
David W. Opderbeck*
INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) and AI-assisted technologies are set to
transform the pharmaceutical, biologic, and medical device industries. AI is
accelerating a convergence in the pharmaceutical and medical device
industries and, in the health-care industry more broadly, is similar to the
convergence of the media, entertainment, and communications industries.1
For media and communications, AI-fueled convergence might mean new
video entertainment generated on the fly or sophisticated, analytical,
autonomous versions of the AI-generated auto-replies that have started to
show up in our email and text apps over the past year, reducing the drudgery
of clearing an inbox.2 For health care, big datasets and complex algorithms
will integrate the development and delivery of small- and large-molecule
drugs, genetic therapies, and medical devices tailored to specific user profiles
and even to individual consumers, with dynamic, real-time updates and
adjustments.3 The lines between software code, device, and drug will blur,
and new regulatory models will be required. As a recent “Global Life
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School and Director, Gibbons Institute of
Law, Science & Technology. Thanks to Carl Coleman, Frank Pasquale, John Jacobi, Ari
Waldman, Jordan Paradise, and Dr. Tina Morrison for helpful comments on earlier versions
of this Essay. This Essay was prepared for the Symposium entitled Rise of the Machines:
Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, hosted by the Fordham Law
Review and the Neuroscience and Law Center on February 15, 2019, at Fordham University
School of Law. For an overview of the Symposium, see Deborah W. Denno & Ryan
Surujnath, Foreword: Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the
Reprogramming of Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 381 (2019).
1. For a discussion of convergence, see Henry Jenkins, Convergence?: I Diverge., MIT
TECH. REV. (June 1, 2001), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/401042/convergence-idiverge/ [https://perma.cc/UU37-D5RQ].
2. See, e.g., Christy Roland, The Convergence of Convergence: Examples of Digital,
Media, Video, Technology and Industry Converging in the 21st Century, AT&T SHAPE (Nov.
20, 2018), https://shape.att.com/blog/examples-of-convergence [https://perma.cc/5HB4SN56].
3. See, e.g., Nic Fleming, Computer-Calculated Compounds, 557 NATURE S55, S55–S57
(2018); Denise Myshko & Robin Robinson, Artificial Intelligence: Molecule to Market,
PHARMAVOICE (Jan. 2019), https://www.pharmavoice.com/article/2019-01-pharma-ai/
[https://perma.cc/TE29-26M3].
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Sciences Outlook” report by the consultancy Deloitte states, “[t]he physical,
digital, and biological worlds converge in Industry 4.0.”4
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has begun to address some
of the opportunities and challenges that AI presents for drug, biologic, and
medical device regulation. This is particularly true for medical devices and
for certain kinds of virtual patient models. In the short term, the FDA should
pay more attention to protocols for AI-assisted drug and biologic trials and
to privacy and cybersecurity in medical devices. In the longer term, AI could
dramatically lower development costs and transform the blockbuster patentdriven model of drug development. At the same time, AI could shift control
of drug, biologic, and device markets from the biopharmaceutical industry to
Silicon Valley.
Before this shift happens, U.S. and international
policymaking bodies should consider how regulatory and intellectual
property policy regarding AI and drugs, biologics, and devices could lead to
a more equitable and sustainable future for global health.
Part I of this Essay surveys the current legal and economic framework for
drugs, biologics, and medical devices in the United States, and discusses
some ways in which AI might disrupt that framework. Part II examines
currently emerging policies at the FDA for in silico trials—trials conducted
by computer models, often involving AI technologies—and AI-enabled
medical devices. Part II also discusses how AI might stretch those policies
over the next ten to twenty years and takes a speculative look at AI-enabled
drugs and devices in the year 2050. Part III concludes.
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL AND ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS AND MEDICAL DEVICES IN THE UNITED
STATES
Pharmaceutical drugs, medical devices, and biologic products are essential
to both public health and big business.5 There are different regulatory
pathways for drugs, biologics, and devices in the United States. The Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act6 (“FD & C Act”) governs the sale of
prescription drugs through the FDA.7 Under the FD & C Act, the FDA is
also responsible for regulating biologics and medical devices.8 The
economics of drugs, biologics, and devices differ in important ways. The
economics of drug and device markets also differ significantly, in no small
part because of these regulatory differences.
4. DELOITTE,
2019
GLOBAL
LIFE
SCIENCES
OUTLOOK
23
(2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Life-Sciences-HealthCare/gx-lshc-ls-outlook-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR38-EE5P].
5. The Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturer’s Association claims that
biopharmaceutical companies invest $90 billion in research and development and support
4.7 million jobs in the United States. 2018 Profile: Biopharmaceutical Research Industry,
PHRMA 1, http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/industryprofile/2018/pdfs/2018_IndustryProfile_
Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/J988-958F] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
6. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–60 (2012).
8. Id.
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A. Pharmaceutical Drug Regulation
Before the FDA authorizes a new drug for sale, the manufacturer must
demonstrate that the drug is safe and effective for its proposed uses and that
its benefits outweigh its risks.9 The manufacturer must also show that the
product will be accompanied by appropriate labeling, including any required
warnings, and that the methods used in manufacturing the drug and the
controls used to maintain the drug’s quality are adequate to preserve the
drug’s identity, strength, quality, and purity.10 This information must be
presented to the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research in a “New
Drug Application” (NDA).11
1. Discovery, Development, and Preclinical Research
The drug development process begins with a “discovery and development”
phase, which involves basic research into public health issues, disease
processes, new technologies, and new molecular compounds.12 Promising
drug candidates identified during the discovery and development phase move
into a “preclinical research” phase.13 In this phase, the drug candidate is
tested “in vitro,” in a test tube, and “in vivo,” on living organisms other than
humans.14 The primary purpose of this phase is to obtain information about
dosage and toxicity levels to determine whether the drug should be tested on
humans.15
2. Clinical Research
If the preclinical research phase suggests that a drug might be a good
candidate for human trials, the next step is the clinical research phase. Before
beginning clinical research, the drug developer or sponsor must submit an
“Investigational New Drug Application” to the FDA.16 This application
must include animal study and toxicity data, manufacturing information,
clinical protocols for proposed studies, data from any prior human research,
and information about the investigator.17

9. Id. § 355.
10. Id.
11. See generally Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/office-medical-products-and-tobacco/center-drug-evaluationand-research [https://perma.cc/96UZ-CMDU] (last updated Sept. 19, 2018).
12. See Step 1: Discovery and Development, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-1-discovery-and-development
[https://perma.cc/8NKN-9R7T] (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).
13. See Step 2: Preclinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
patients/drug-development-process/step-2-preclinical-research
[https://perma.cc/Y92S6C2R] (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/patients/
drug-development-process/step-3-clinical-research [https://perma.cc/3CJC-4LRQ] (last
updated Jan. 4, 2018).
17. Id.
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The clinical research phase includes three subphases of clinical trials plus
a possible fourth postapproval phase. A drug candidate may fail at any of
the first three phases. Phase 1 tests for safety and dosage, involves 20 to 100
healthy volunteers or people with the target disease or condition, and lasts
for several months.18 Approximately 70 percent of drug candidates pass this
phase.19 Phase 2 tests for efficacy and side effects, involves up to several
hundred people with the disease or condition, and lasts up to two years.20
Only 33 percent of drug candidates pass this phase.21 Phase 3 tests for
efficacy and adverse reactions, involves 300 to 3000 people who have the
disease or condition, and lasts one to four years.22
If the drug developer believes the evidence from the clinical research phase
shows the drug is safe and effective for its intended use, the developer can
submit an NDA to the FDA.23 The FDA review team must determine
whether to approve the NDA within six to ten months of the filing.24 If the
FDA review team finds issues that must be addressed before approval, it may
require further information or additional studies.25 Approximately 80
percent of NDAs ultimately are approved by the FDA.26 After marketing
approval, the drug may proceed to Phase 4 clinical trials.27 Phase 4 involves
several thousand people who have the disease or condition and postmarket
tests for safety and efficacy.28 Altogether, it can cost up to $2.8 billion to
bring a drug all the way through to FDA review.29
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Step 4: FDA Drug Review, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
patients/drug-development-process/step-4-fda-drug-review [https://perma.cc/6E8W-RPKY]
(last updated Jan. 4, 2018).
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See Rebecca Trager, FDA New Drug Approvals More Than Doubled in 2017,
CHEMISTRY WORLD (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/fda-new-drugapprovals-more-than-doubled-in-2017/3008575.article [https://perma.cc/RWV4-EWJS].
27. In some cases, the FDA requires Phase 4 trials, but in other cases Phase 4 trials are
voluntary. See, e.g., Viraj Suvarna, Phase IV of Drug Development, 1 PERSP. CLINICAL RES.
57, 58 (2010).
28. See id. at 57.
29. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates
of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 27 (2016). Some other studies argue that this estimate
is too high. See, e.g., Nancy L. Yu et al., R&D Costs for Pharmaceutical Companies Do Not
Explain Elevated US Drug Prices, HEALTH AFF. (Mar. 7, 2017), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170307.059036/full/
[https://perma.cc/8DEUYR2L]. But see Henry Grabowski & Richard Manning, Drug Prices and Medical Innovation:
A Response to Yu, Helms, and Bach, HEALTH AFF. (June 2, 2017), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170602.060369/full/
[https://perma.cc/X35KQK93]; Donald W. Light, Debunking the Pharmaceutical Research ‘Free Rider’ Myth: A
Response to Yu, Helms, and Bach, HEALTH AFF. (June 2, 2017), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170602.060376/full/
[https://perma.cc/D9DDRVZF]; Nancy L. Yu & Peter Bach, US Drug Prices and R&D, Take 2: A Reply to Grabowski
and Manning, and to Light, HEALTH AFF. (July 27, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hblog20170727.061220/full/ [https://perma.cc/ZDH7-XWMP].
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The FDA has approved an average of forty-three new drugs per year since
2015.30 The total of fifty-nine drugs approved by the FDA in 2018 was an
all-time high.31 Approval numbers have rebounded after a decade-long lull
between 2001 and 2010, for a variety of macroeconomic and business
reasons.32
B. Biologics and Gene Therapies
The description above relates to traditional small-molecule pharmaceutical
drugs, which still make up about 90 percent of all drugs on the market.33
Such drugs are relatively simple chemical entities synthesized by chemical
reactions.34 They are usually processed into easily ingestible capsules or
tablets and are absorbed directly into the bloodstream after ingestion.35 In
recent years, researchers increasingly have focused on large-molecule
biologic products and on genomics.36
Large-molecule or “biologic” drugs are made of proteins, usually copied
or modified from existing human proteins.37 They are typically synthesized
using genetically modified organisms such as bacteria or yeasts, or by
cultivating human cell lines.38 Proteins bind to cell receptors, which means
they can be engineered to bind selectively to diseased cells, such as cancer
cells.39 They are taken by injection or infusion because they would be
digested if taken orally, and the method of delivery often involves the use of
antibodies or virus carriers.40 Biologic drugs in the United States are subject
to the same approval process as small-molecule drugs, but their complexity
makes them even harder to develop and test for human use, which is one
reason why they comprise such a small percentage of overall new drug
approvals.41

30. See Novel Drug Approvals for 2019, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/new-drugs-fda-cders-new-molecular-entities-and-newtherapeutic-biological-products/novel-drug-approvals-2019 [https://perma.cc/WU83-DQVS]
(last updated July 22, 2019).
31. See John LaMattina, Can the Record Breaking Number of FDA New Drug Approvals
Continue?, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2019, 7:59 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/
2019/01/09/can-the-record-breaking-number-of-fda-new-drug-approvals-continue/ [https://
perma.cc/SP48-JATY].
32. Id.
33. See Small and Large Molecules, BAYER PHARMACEUTICALS, http://pharma.
bayer.com/en/innovation-partnering/technologies-and-trends/small-and-large-molecules/
[https://perma.cc/T6R7-3Q7B] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG.,
https://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ
[https://perma.cc/L7XFV8TN] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019); What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/about-center-biologics-evaluation-and-
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Like small-molecule drugs, applied research in biologics is mostly
conducted by private pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms that hope to
achieve large returns secured by patents, but universities are also engaged in
significant applied research.42 The patent landscape for biologics is in flux
and is perhaps more uncertain than for small-molecule drugs, although this
uncertainty may suggest substantial opportunity for investment.43
Genetic therapies could involve repairing a mutated gene, “knocking out”
a damaged gene, or “introducing a new gene into the body.”44 New geneediting technologies such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short
Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) are making gene editing cheaper, faster, and
more precise.45 Such technologies also are raising the possibility of germline genetic editing, that is, genetic editing of egg and sperm cells, to
eliminate diseases in the future human population or select for certain traits
or “improvements.”46
Biologic drugs entail similar regulatory hurdles to small-molecule drugs:
their effects must be modeled in the lab, in animals, and in humans before
FDA approval.47 However, there are important differences in the approval
pathway for “biosimilar” products, those that might qualify for an
abbreviated approval process because they are similar to an existing
approved product.48
Genetic therapies are a subset of biologics. Such therapies could involve
repairing a mutated gene, knocking out a damaged gene, or introducing a new
research-cber/what-are-biologics-questions-and-answers
[https://perma.cc/WBR7-E9KL]
(last updated Feb. 6, 2018).
42. See generally Kevan M. A. Gartland & Jill S. Gartland, Opportunities in
Biotechnology, 282 J. BIOTECHNOLOGY 38 (2018).
43. See CHRISTOPHER MCKENNA & STEVE ARLINGTON, CLARIVATE ANALYTICS, THE LIFE
SCIENCES INNOVATION REPORT: A DATA-DRIVEN VIEW OF EMERGING R&D TRENDS 8–11
(2018),
https://clarivate.com/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2018e/10/Life-SciencesInnovation-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9M2-4CLA]; Nicholas Jones & Alexander Bruce
Dean, Editorial, Current Patenting Trends for Biologics Versus Small Molecules, 1
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT ANALYST 225, 227 (2012); Adam Houldsworth, University
Domination of the Biologics Patent Landscape Points Way to Heightened Deal-Making in the
Coming Years, IAM (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/market-developments/
university-domination-biologics-patent-landscape-points-way-heightened-deal
[https://perma.cc/KVT6-AWYD].
44. What Is Gene Therapy?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/therapy/genetherapy [https://perma.cc/5NXX-CEXS].
45. See What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE
(Aug. 6, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/genomeediting [https://
perma.cc/EG8V-8VWH].
46. See What Are the Ethical Issues Surrounding Gene Therapy?, GENETICS HOME
REFERENCE (Aug. 6, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/therapy/ethics [https://perma.cc/
7U8E-VEAS].
47. See Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biologic Products, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/therapeutic-biologics-applications-bla/frequentlyasked-questions-about-therapeutic-biological-products [https://perma.cc/X9JE-AJJ3] (last
updated July 7, 2015).
48. See Jordan Paradise, Reassessing Safety for Nanotechnology Combination Products:
What Do Biosimilars Add to Regulatory Challenges for the FDA?, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 465,
490–94 (2012).
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gene into the body.49 Some somatic cell gene therapies have been approved
by the FDA.50 The United States presently does not permit federal spending
on human germ-line editing research.
Constructing trials for biologics and genetic therapies is even more
complex than for small-molecule drugs. Because of their chemical
complexity and the complexity of the enzymatic systems in which they
function, the effects of introducing large-molecule biologics into the body
are far less controllable and predictable than for small-molecule drugs.51
Genetic therapies can be even less predictable, particularly if they affect the
germ line.52 Changes to the germ line could cause a cascade of genetic
changes generations into the distant future.53
C. Medical Device Regulation
The FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiologic Health regulates medical
devices and radiation-emitting products.54 Medical devices are classified
according to three classes corresponding to their level of risk.55 The degree
of regulation increases in each class.56
Class I devices are those that are considered reasonably safe and effective
with only “general” controls or that are “not life-supporting or life-sustaining
or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of
human health, and which does not present a potential unreasonable risk of
illness of injury.”57 “General controls” include basic regulatory requirements
relating to adulteration, misbranding, registration, banned devices,
notification and other remedies, records and reports, and other general
provisions of the FD & C Act.58
Class II devices are those that require “special controls,” such as “the
promulgation of performance standards, postmarket surveillance, patient
registries, development and dissemination of guidance documents . . . ,
recommendations, and other appropriate actions as the Commissioner deems

49. What Is Gene Therapy?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/vaccinesblood-biologics/cellular-gene-therapy-products/what-gene-therapy [https://perma.cc/H8UGVQLW] (last updated July 25, 2018).
50. See generally Ali Golchin & Tahereh Zarnoosheh Farahany, Biological Products:
Cellular Therapy and FDA Approved Products, 15 STEM CELL REVIEWS & REP. 166 (2019);
Approved Cellular and Gene Therapy Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/cellular-gene-therapy-products/approved-cellularand-gene-therapy-products [https://perma.cc/8A4D-HL37] (last updated Mar. 29, 2019).
51. See How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, supra note 41.
52. See What Are the Ethical Issues Surrounding Gene Therapy?, supra note 46.
53. Id.
54. See Overview of Device Regulation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/overview-deviceregulation [https://perma.cc/PH9S-A6WD] (last updated Aug. 31, 2018).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (2019).
58. Id.
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necessary” to provide reasonable assurance that the device is safe and
effective.59
A device falls in Class III if it is “life-supporting or life-sustaining, or for
a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health, or if the device presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or
injury” or is not substantially equivalent to a Class II device for which special
controls are sufficient.60 Class III devices require “premarket approval”
(PMA) or “premarket notification” (PMN).61 PMAs for Class III devices
traditionally require clinical trials, but the 21st Century Cures Act62 (the
“Cures Act”) permits the use of observational studies or clinical experience
in some cases in lieu of clinical trials.63
A PMN, also called a 510(k) application, may be available if the applicant
can demonstrate the device is substantially equivalent to an approved
predicate Class I or Class II device and can be marketed with special
controls.64 Under section 510(k) of the FD & C Act and related regulations,
device manufacturers must notify the FDA of their intent to market a medical
device at least ninety days before marketing.65 During this period, the FDA
will determine whether the device is new or is substantially equivalent to an
existing device.66
In 2017, the FDA published guidance for “De Novo Classification
Requests” to classify new kinds of devices in Class I or II that would
otherwise automatically fall into Class III.67 The De Novo process is
available for devices determined to be “not substantially equivalent” to
existing devices because of “(1) the lack of an identifiable predicate device,
(2) a new intended use, or (3) different technological characteristics that raise
different questions of safety and effectiveness.”68 The applicant must
demonstrate that the device appears, “based on what is known about the
device, to meet the statutory standards for classification into class I or class
59. Id. § 860.3(c)(2).
60. Id. § 860.3(c)(3).
61. Id.
62. See Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
63. See id. § 1002, 130 Stat. at 1042; Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices and the FDA:
Part 2, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 277, 279 (2016).
64. Premarket Notification 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-notification-510k
[https://perma.cc/
A8NS-RHUZ] (last updated Sept. 27, 2018). A very limited number of Class III devices also
potentially can be approved under an abbreviated humanitarian device exemption. See
Humanitarian Device Exemption, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/premarket-submissions/humanitarian-device-exemption
[https://perma.cc/T2NS33SN] (last updated Mar. 27, 2018).
65. 21 C.F.R. § 807.81 (2019).
66. Id.; 510(k) Clearances, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/device-approvals-denials-and-clearances/510k-clearances
[https://perma.cc/332FJ53V] (last updated Sept. 4, 2018).
67. See generally FDA, DE NOVO CLASSIFICATION PROCESS (EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC
CLASS III DESIGNATION): GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/72674/download [https://perma.cc/R6CQ-UVTN].
68. Id. at 4–6.
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II.”69 The applicant must also “sufficiently understand and be able to
explain . . . the probable risks to health and probable benefits of the device,
explain the measures needed to effectively mitigate all probable risks, and
explain how device safety and effectiveness can be assured through the
application of general controls or general and special controls.”70
A device may be reclassified from Class III to Class II, either by sponsor
petition or FDA initiative, if available scientific evidence shows that general
and special controls provide a reasonable assurance of the device’s safety and
efficacy.71 This can be important for a number of reasons, including that the
reclassified device can serve as a basis for a PMN. A manufacturer might
obtain approval for a novel Class III device, have the device reclassified, and
then obtain PMNs for incremental modifications, which establish a market
position, usually supported by patents, around a core concept.72
D. Economic Effects of the Current Model
Because of the expense, complexity, and time horizon of the clinical
research phase, many approved drugs are either sponsored by large
multinational pharmaceutical companies or acquired by such companies after
initial development by smaller companies. The top twenty companies for
total new drug and new therapeutic biologic product approvals from 2015 to
2018, for example, were as follows:

69. Id. at 6.
70. Id.
71. See Reclassification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/cdrh-transparency/reclassification [https://perma.cc/VW4J-6HTK] (last updated Feb. 14,
2019).
72. See Van Norman, supra note 63, at 278.
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Table 173
Company

Market
Number of
Publicly Traded Capitalization
Approvals
in 2019 ($bn)

Pfizer Inc.

9

NYSE

194.743

Eli Lilly & Co.

7

NYSE

103.985

AstraZeneca PLC

5

NYSE

112.238

Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

4

Nasdaq

21.481

Amgen Inc.

4

Nasdaq

116.58

Array BioPharma

4

No74

—

Genentech

4

No

—

Gilead Sciences, Inc.

4

Nasdaq

79.445

Janssen Pharmaceuticals

4

No

—

AAA USA Inc.

3

No

—

AbbVie Inc.

3

NYSE

107.336

Allergan PLC

3

NYSE

54.514

Astellas Pharma Inc.

3

Tokyo Stock
Exchange

26.942

GlaxoSmithKline PLC

3

NYSE

104.912

Novartis AG

3

NYSE

196.594

Shire Dev LLC

3

No75

—

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries
Ltd.

3

National Stock
Exchange (India)

907.748

Teva Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd.

3

NYSE

7.491

Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc.

3

Nasdaq

43.24

73. This chart was compiled using information from the FDA’s website and Yahoo!
Finance. See New Drugs at FDA: CDER’s New Molecular Entities and New Therapeutic
Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DrugInnovation/default.htm [https://perma.cc/2MNZ-423Q]
(last updated Feb. 2, 2018); YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com [https://perma.cc/V653QPP4] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). The financial information is current as of October 6, 2019.
74. Array BioPharma was acquired by Pfizer in 2019. Jared S. Hopkins & Kimberly Chin,
Pfizer to Buy Cancer Drug Maker Array BioPharma for $10.64 Billion, WALL ST. J. (June 17,
2019, 3:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-to-acquire-array-biopharma-for-11-4billion-enterprise-value-11560769500 [https://perma.cc/3JTJ-8QFA].
75. Shire Dev LLC was acquired by Takeda in 2019. Preetika Rana, Takeda Wins
Shareholder Approval for Its Shire Megadeal, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2018, 11:54 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/takeda-wins-shareholder-approval-for-its-62-billion-shire-bid1543982265?mod=mktw [https://perma.cc/8M2G-DGGG].
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The role of major pharmaceutical companies in the clinical research phase
leading up to FDA approval means that most applied drug research in the
United States is funded by private capital and directed by the market. This
is in stark contrast to basic research, which is funded largely by governmental
spending of tax dollars and directed by public officials through the National
Institutes of Health (NIH).76
The role of private capital in applied drug research determines the
fundamental importance of patents in the drug development process.77 Drug
companies apply for patents on the chemical composition of promising new
compounds early in the development cycle. Patents can also be obtained on
new uses and combinations of existing compounds. A patent confers an
exclusive right to make, use, sell, or offer for sale the patented invention,
which expires twenty years after the date the patent application is filed, with
some possible extensions for some drug products.78
Because of the long regulatory approval lead time, by the time an approved
new drug reaches the market, only four to six years of patent life usually
remain.79 Drug companies and their investors and lenders therefore rely on
a model in which a relatively small number of research targets eventually
produce a large market return over a short time window. This dynamic
means that consumers must pay prices for new drugs that are many multiples
Traditional small-molecule
over a competitive market price.80
pharmaceuticals are relatively cheap and easy to manufacture, even with
regulatory requirements for good manufacturing practices.81 The market
price of a new small-molecule drug might reflect a multiplier of hundreds or
even thousands over the marginal cost of production per dose.82 At least this
was the industry’s business model until the new drug pipeline began to dry
up.83
The need to obtain such a high price premium means that drug
development is geared toward segments of the market with low price
76. See Grants & Funding, NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/grantsfunding [https://perma.cc/8U9K-JNHV] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
77. See David W. Opderbeck, Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58
VAND. L. REV. 501, 518–19 (2005).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
79. See Dennis S. Fernandez et al., The Interface of Patents with the Regulatory Drug
Approval Process and How Resulting Interplay Can Affect Market Entry, ipHANDBOOK BEST
PRACTICES
968–70,
http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/chPDFs/ch10/ipHandbookCh%2010%2009%20Fernandez-Huie-Hsu%20Patent%20and%20FDA%20Interface%
20rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV45-FPZ6] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
80. See generally Patricia Danzon, Value-Based Differential Pricing: Efficient Prices for
Drugs in a Global Context, 24 HEALTH ECON. 294 (2015).
81. See, e.g., Opderbeck, supra note 77, at 522–27.
82. See id.
83. See Editorial, Lessons from Lipitor and the Broken Blockbuster Drug Model, 378
LANCET 1976, 1976 (2011). But see Richard Harrison, 2018 Could Be a Record Year for
Blockbuster Drugs, PHARMATIMES ONLINE (Apr. 9, 2018), http://www.pharmatimes.com/
web_exclusives/2018_could_be_a_record_year_for_blockbuster_drugs_1230918
[https://perma.cc/CGG8-LQ8W].
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elasticity of demand.84 Low price elasticity of demand means that demand
responds relatively slowly to changes in price.85 Demand for health care is
relatively inelastic in developed economies where consumers are more
affluent or have access to health insurance that covers prescription drugs.
The patent-distorted market, therefore, not surprisingly, directs drug
discovery away from remedies for conditions that primarily affect the poor
or excludes the poor from access to treatments for conditions that afflict the
rich and poor alike.86
This dynamic raises both distributional and other economic concerns.
From the perspective of distributive justice, it seems unfair that rich people
receive a much higher share of society’s resources for new drug treatments
than low income individuals. From an economic perspective, the high cost
of drugs and other health care contributes to increased concentrations of
wealth by ensuring that those who are already wealthy are also healthier and
therefore better able to produce more wealth for themselves, while those who
are low income experience health problems as economically catastrophic.
The primary way the United States deals with the high cost of drugs and
other health care is through private and public health insurance.87 A middleor upper-class American with a job likely can obtain health insurance from a
private insurer via an employer-sponsored plan or through a private plan.
These payers exert downward pressure on health-care costs by negotiating
rates with providers and by managing the care provided, for example, through
procedure approvals and drug formularies.88 Medicaid and Medicare provide
public, government-funded health insurance for the poor and elderly,
respectively, and also attempt to contain costs through managed care and
approved drug formularies. Obamacare was meant to provide access to
affordable health insurance for people outside of Medicaid or Medicare who
otherwise might be uninsured, although the U.S. Supreme Court and
Congress have since limited key elements of the Obamacare scheme.89
The extent to which private payers, Medicaid, or Medicare can contain
provider costs is often limited, particularly in relation to patented prescription
medications that are medically indicated for a patient’s treatment. Moreover,
although private health insurance is available to many working Americans
well beyond the superrich, in global terms a middle-class American with a
job that provides an employer-sponsored health plan is comparatively

84.
85.
86.
87.

See Opderbeck, supra note 77, at 525–30.
Id.
See id.
See Simon F. Haeder, Why the U.S. Has Higher Drug Prices Than Other Countries,
CONVERSATION (Feb. 7, 2019, 6:31 AM), http://theconversation.com/why-the-us-has-higherdrug-prices-than-other-countries-111256 [https://perma.cc/7TMR-C3RX]; Ben Hirschler,
How the U.S. Pays 3 Times More for Drugs, SCI. AM. (Oct. 13, 2015),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-u-s-pays-3-times-more-for-drugs/
[https://perma.cc/W3PV-G3MA];
88. See generally Danzon, supra note 80.
89. See Haeder, supra note 87.
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wealthy.90 It remains true, then, that private capital, secured by patents
owned by private pharmaceutical companies, channels much of the global
capacity in applied drug research towards conditions that affect wealthy
Americans and thereby further entrenches national and global income
disparities.91
Many of the same market dynamics apply to biologics, but the picture is
less clear because of the complexity of these products, the differences in the
regulatory pathway particularly for biosimilars, and corresponding
differences in patent protection. Some scholars argue that, even aside from
patents, biologics are a form of natural monopoly because of high
infrastructure costs, scientific uncertainty, and other barriers to entry.92
Others dispute the idea that biologics are natural monopolies but agree that
the current biosimilar pathway is not working.93 In any event, although these
scholars disagree on some of the causes, they agree that, like drugs, biologic
prices are too high.
Finally, since medical devices encompass everything from wooden tongue
depressors to artificial hearts, it is much more difficult to generalize about
the interplay between regulatory law, intellectual property law, and market
forces than it is for prescription drugs. One thing all analysts agree upon is
that the “medtech” industry is growing. A recent Deloitte report, for
example, states that “[M]edtech is projected to grow at a 5.6 percent
[compound annual growth rate] over the forecast period 2017–2024” to $595
billion in global sales.94 As this rapidly growing industry converges with
drugs and biologics through AI-assisted devices, economic concerns about
cost and access will persist.
E. How AI Will Disrupt the Current Model
1. Scientific and Regulatory Disruption
As the brief description above suggests, the pharmaceutical, biologic, and
medical device industries are ripe for disruption by AI. For drugs and
90. The costs of Medicare and Medicaid, of course, are borne by the American tax base,
that is, by relatively well-off middle- and upper-class Americans whose private insurance pays
for their own health care—or the costs are added to a massive public debt that will bankrupt
these programs if not fixed in coming decades. See H.R. DOC. NO. 116-29, at 18 (2019); H.R.
DOC. NO. 116-28, at 9–11 (2019).
91. See generally Opderbeck, supra note 77.
92. See Preston Atteberry et al., Biologics Are Natural Monopolies (Part 1): Why
Biosimilars Do Not Create Effective Competition, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190405.396631/full/
[https://perma.cc/
9VLZ-G3J2]; Mark Trusheim et al., Biologics Are Natural Monopolies (Part 2): A Proposal
for Post-Exclusivity Price Regulation of Biologics, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190405.839549/full/
[https://perma.cc/5G2T-WS8K].
93. See Alex Brill & Benedic Ippolito, Biologics Are Not Natural Monopolies, HEALTH
AFF. BLOG (July 2, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190701.34
9559/full/ [https://perma.cc/3ZKJ-EPBC].
94. DELOITTE, supra note 4, at 10.
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biologics, at the basic research stage, the science involves, at least, all of the
possible large and small molecules that might interact with the human body,
all of the naturally occurring human genetic variations that may produce
health effects, and all of the possible engineered genetic alterations that may
produce health effects. That is, the starting dataset is as big as all of human
evolutionary history, biochemistry, and genetics. Of course, there is already
a wealth of prior art on the findings of about two hundred years of modern
basic and applied biochemical science and about fifty years of modern
genomics research, but all this cumulative human effort over the past two
centuries has only begun to unlock nature’s secrets. AI could accelerate the
pace of basic biochemical and genetic research exponentially, for example,
by in silico modeling of chemical reactions or genetic changes using very
large datasets.
At the applied research stage, for traditional and biologic drugs, the current
paradigm involves costly, lengthy, and relatively imprecise modeling in test
tubes and on animals, followed by even more costly and less precise
modeling in human subjects, which also entails ethical questions about
human trials.95 AI could also exponentially reduce the time and cost,
increase the precision, and mitigate ethical concerns about human trials at
this stage through in silico modeling.
Indeed, techniques such as high-throughput screening are already being
used for basic and applied drug research. The FDA is taking a proactive but
cautious approach towards the use of in silico trials at least as part of the in
vitro component of the standard drug approval framework. The AI
technology is not yet as robust in this area as the hype about its potential
suggests, but there are good reasons to think the hype is not merely hype.96
Perhaps in the foreseeable future AI will not relegate every old-school bench
scientist to the historical footnotes or replace the need for all animal or human
trials; but as the wealth of literature on the subjects suggests, there is no doubt

95. These include the circumstances under which it is acceptable to administer placebos
to control groups of human subjects or to conduct research with persons who lack the mental
capacity to provide informed consent. Existing guidelines hold that properly constructed and
administered double-blind human trials can be ethically appropriate in light of the need to test
drugs for efficacy and safety. See, e.g., Cecilia Nardini, The Ethics of Clinical Trials,
ECANCERMEDICALSCIENCE, Jan. 16, 2014, at 1, 5; Patient Recruitment: Ethics in Clinical
Research, NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH, https://clinicalcenter.nih.gov/recruit/ethics.html
[https://perma.cc/8WEH-ATBJ] (last updated June 28, 2019).
96. For a small sampling of the outpouring of writing on this issue, see generally,
Hongming Chen et al., The Rise of Deep Learning in Drug Discovery, 23 DRUG DISCOVERY
TODAY 1241 (2018); Wlodzislow Duch et al., Artificial Intelligence Approaches for Rational
Drug Design and Discovery, 13 CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL DESIGN 1497 (2007); Sean
Elkins, The Next Era: Deep Learning in Pharmaceutical Research, 33 PHARMACEUTICAL RES.
2594 (2016); Erik Gawehn et al., Deep Learning in Drug Discovery, 35 MOLECULAR
INFORMATICS 3 (2016); Edward J. Griffen et al., Can We Accelerate Medicinal Chemistry by
Augmenting the Chemist with Big Data and Artificial Intelligence?, 23 DRUG DISCOVERY
TODAY 1373 (2018); David Hecht, Applications of Machine Learning and Computational
Intelligence to Drug Discovery and Development, 72 DRUG DEV. RES. 53 (2011); and Matthew
A. Sellwood et al., Artificial Intelligence in Drug Discovery, 10 FUTURE MEDICINAL
CHEMISTRY 2025 (2018).
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that current methods of drug discovery and drug testing are ripe for AI
disruption.
Relating to genetic therapies, there are already research projects underway
to interpret the entire human genetic sequence and to create large databases
of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) across human populations, with
the hope of identifying specific effects or conditions that correlate with
certain nucleotide variants.97 Among the significant challenges for this
research include the number of nucleotides in the human genome
(approximately 3.2 billion), the number of SNPs in each human individual’s
genome (approximately 5 million), the number of human population-level
SNPs so far identified (approximately 100 million), and epigenetic,
environmental, and other factors that might contribute to conditions
correlated with genetic variations.98 This is a classic case for big data
analytics. For example, a Google-sponsored team has employed a neural
network tool it calls “DeepVariant” to read an individual’s genetic data.99
Some researchers predict that, in the not-distant future, AI-driven
pharmacogenetics “will be widely used to predict personalized drug response
and optimize medication selection and dosing, using knowledge extracted
from large and complex molecular, epidemiological, clinical, and
demographic datasets.”100
Concerning medical devices, software and connectivity has already
created the “Internet of Medical Things” (IoMT), a segment of the medical
device market valued at over $40 billion and expected to rise to over $155
billion by 2022.101 These include wearable and implantable devices with
sensors that provide information to users and their doctors.102
In addition to the IoMT, analysts describe “Software-as-a-MedicalDevice” (SaMD) as yet another industry segment.103 This can include
software embedded in medical device hardware or stand-alone software that
performs medical functions such as diagnosis.104 For example, researchers
at DeepMind, a health-care AI initiative acquired by Google in 2014, recently
97. See
Databases
&
Tools,
HUM.
GENOME
VARIATION
SOC’Y,
https://www.hgvs.org/content/databases-tools [https://perma.cc/UW2J-ULP7] (last updated
July 30, 2019); dbSNP, NCBI, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/snp/ [https://perma.cc/5SMUYGV3] (last updated Apr. 8, 2019); What Are Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs)?,
GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Aug. 6, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/
genomicresearch/snp [https://perma.cc/VHU2-JU9X]; What Is the Encyclopedia of DNA
Elements (ENCODE) Project?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/encode [https://perma.cc/6SPB-TA6D].
98. See TERRENCE A. BROWN, GENOMES § 1.2 (2d ed. 2002); What Are Single Nucleotide
Polymorphisms (SNPs)?, supra note 97.
99. See generally Alexandr A. Kalinin et al., Deep Learning in Pharmacogenomics:
From Gene Regulation to Patient Stratification, 19 PHARMACOGENOMICS 629 (2018); Ryan
Poplin et al., A Universal SNP and Small-Indel Variant Caller Using Deep Neural Networks,
36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 983 (2018).
100. See generally Kalinin et al., supra note 99; Poplin et al., supra note 99.
101. DELOITTE, supra note 4, at 25.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 26.
104. See id.
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reported that deep learning–based analysis of optical coherence tomography
(OCT) scans to detect retinal disease met or exceeded the performance of
human experts on the same dataset.105
Significant hurdles remain before AI can replace humans in clinical
diagnostic settings. As the DeepMind team noted in its OCT paper, these
include the following: (1) “AI (typically trained on hundreds of thousands
of examples from one canonical dataset) must generalise to new populations
and devices without a substantial loss of performance, and without
prohibitive data requirements for retraining”; (2) “AI tools must be
applicable to real-world scans, problems and pathways, and designed for
clinical evaluation and deployment”; and (3) “AI tools must match or exceed
the performance of human experts in such real-world situations.”106 All of
these, however, are problems the technology should begin to overcome in the
relatively near future.
2. Economic Disruption
As the discussion above suggests, there is a great deal of hype and buzz—
much of it justified—over the potential for AI to revolutionize health-care
technology. AI could also disrupt the current economic model for drug and
device discovery and development. Most obviously, AI could reduce the
enormous sunk costs of finding and testing new drugs, which could upset the
blockbuster patent cycle. This could make drugs more affordable, while also
challenging pharmaceutical industry’s dominant business model—or, it
could heighten calls for regulation of the industry that continues to sell drugs
at high, patent-supported prices even as development costs fall.
AI could also help identify personalized drug treatments, design customtailored implants, or even create highly customizable genetic therapies
applicable only to a small population, perhaps even to specific individuals
who could afford them.107 This could spur niche industries in personalized
pharmaceuticals, devices, and genetic treatments, creating jobs and economic
opportunities for workers and investors in those businesses. It could also
increase economic inequality, perhaps dramatically.
Today, wealthy people who can afford quality health care are more
economically productive because they are healthier. Those economic
105. Jeffrey De Fauw et al., Clinically Applicable Deep Learning for Diagnosis and
Referral in Retinal Disease, 24 NATURE MED. 1342, 1343 (2018). On DeepMind generally,
see DEEPMIND, https://deepmind.com/ [https://perma.cc/LVX9-VG5D] (last visited Oct. 6,
2019).
106. See De Fauw et al., supra note 105, at 1342.
107. It is already the case that computer-assisted design (CAD) software and 3-D printers
are used to create orthodontic aligners, dental implants, and orthopedic implants. See, e.g.,
Rick Ferguson, 2018—The Year of 3-D Printing in the Dental Office?, DENTAL ECON. (Apr.
1, 2018), https://www.dentaleconomics.com/science-tech/article/16385056/2018the-year-of3d-printing-in-the-dental-office [https://perma.cc/TV9D-NNDG]; P. D. Olson, 100,000
Patients Later, the 3D-Printed Hip Is a Decade Old and Going Strong, GE REP. (Mar. 5,
2018), https://www.ge.com/reports/100000-patients-later-3d-printed-hip-decade-old-goingstrong/ [https://perma.cc/CS6D-P5XX].
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benefits are passed on to their children, who also can thereby enjoy higher
levels of health and wealth, while low-income people who cannot afford
quality health care become trapped in cycles of declining health and
wealth.108 With personalized health care, including drug and genetic
treatments (and enhancements), the wealthy could become so physically
robust that low-income people cannot possibly compete. It could even
happen that in the distant future the wealthy might evolve into a different
“transhuman” species while the poor remain ordinary humans.109 A trope in
science fiction involves an elite genetically and/or cybernetically enhanced
master class that dominates the unenhanced masses who cannot afford
enhancements.110 This is still science fiction, but it is fiction rooted in the
real capabilities of technologies being developed today.
With less human involvement in the drug and device process, treatments
may be found that are unpatentable under existing patent law because there
is no human “inventor.” And since a deep learning AI is only as good as its
training data, access to patient information and demographic data will serve
a role similar to oil today—a basic resources that fuels other industries.111
The most valuable intellectual property in the pharmaceutical sector may
shift from patents on particular compounds or treatments to copyrights and
trade secrets in the AI’s code and algorithms and to the datasets the AI
consumes. Silicon Valley, the economic Borg, may one day assimilate the
multinational pharmaceutical industry.112
At the same time, at a global level, AI could provide a more accurate
understanding of the treatments that could do the most good for more of the
world’s population, based on massive epidemiological and genetic datasets.
Specifically, AI could paint an even clearer picture of how a blockbuster
patent model of applied drug discovery funded by equity markets benefits the
minority of people in the rich global North at the expense of the majority of

108. See, e.g., Dhruv Khullar & Dave A. Chokshi, Health, Income, & Poverty: Where We
Are & What Could Help 1–2, HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
do/10.1377/hpb20180817.901935/full/HPB_2017_RWJF_05_W.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
X2S9-7S8R].
109. See, e.g., HUMANITY+, https://humanityplus.org/ [https://perma.cc/B9M8-5QQR]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
110. Pierce Brown’s Red Rising series provides a good example. See generally PIERCE
BROWN, DARK AGE (2019); PIERCE BROWN, GOLDEN SON (2015); PIERCE BROWN, IRON GOLD
(2018); PIERCE BROWN, MORNING STAR (2016); PIERCE BROWN, RED RISING (2014). Kim
Stanley Robinson’s Mars trilogy provides another perspective, at first more sanguine but also
hortatory. See generally KIM STANLEY ROBINSON, BLUE MARS (1996); KIM STANLEY
ROBINSON, GREEN MARS (1994); KIM STANLEY ROBINSON, RED MARS (1993).
111. See The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuableresource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/8995-2XD4]. But see Antonio García
Martínez, No, Data Is Not the New Oil, WIRED (Feb. 26, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://
www.wired.com/story/no-data-is-not-the-new-oil/ [https://perma.cc/64B3-JF6V].
112. For readers who are not sci-fi geeks, the “Borg” was a collective entity in the Star
Trek: The Next Generation television and film series that sought to assimilate all life into its
technologically advanced but soulless hive. See Borg, STAR TREK, https://www.startrek.com/
database_article/borg [https://perma.cc/2KT7-2L7N] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
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people in the poor global South.113 In the future—not the immediate future,
but within a present lifetime—AI might be capable of making policy
judgments about resource allocation for drug development and discovery that
make any moral case for reliance on patent-fueled markets definitively
untenable. But the increased use of AI in this area will also raise ethical
problems relating to accountability, equity, and privacy that have already
become apparent in AI applications today.114 All of this suggests that we
should begin thinking now about how AI-enabled drug discovery and
development should be regulated, which is the subject of Part II below.
II. NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
This Part begins with a discussion of the FDA’s current perspectives on in
silico trials for drugs and medical devices. It then turns to possible regulatory
frameworks for plausible uses of AI in drug discovery and development in
the near- to medium-term, that is, over the next five to twenty years. The
middle subsection of this Part considers possible regulatory frameworks over
a longer horizon of twenty to thirty years. The final subsection of this Part
offers a somewhat more fanciful, but not implausible, peek at AI-enabled
drug development and discovery in the year 2050 and into the next century.
A. FDA’s Current Perspective on In Silico Trials for Drugs
The FDA recognizes the potential benefits of in silico trials. In the Cures
Act, Congress appropriated $500 million over eight years for an FDA
“Innovation Account.”115 The Cures Act further directed the secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to work on a number of specific
priorities, including consultations about novel clinical trial designs.116 In
announcing the FDA’s work plan under the Act, FDA Commissioner Scott
Gottlieb highlighted plans to increase the use of in silico trials and other
forms of data monitoring as part of the agency’s innovation plan.117 In a
report accompanying the Senate’s 2016 FDA appropriations bill, the Senate
Committee on Appropriations stated that:
In Silico trials may potentially protect public health, advance personalized
treatment, and be executed quickly and for a fraction of the cost of a full
scale live trial. The FDA has advocated the use of such systems as an
additional innovative research tool. Therefore, the Committee urges FDA
to engage with device and drug sponsors to explore greater use, where

113. Cf. generally Opderbeck, supra note 77.
114. Asilomar AI Principles, FUTURE LIFE INST., https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/
[https://perma.cc/LNG7-MYQT] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
115. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1002, 130 Stat. 1033, 1042–45 (2016).
116. Id. § 3021, 130 Stat. at 1095–96 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 note (Supp.
2017)).
117. Scott Gottlieb, How FDA Plans to Help Consumers Capitalize on Advances in
Science, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 7, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fdavoices-perspectives-fda-experts/how-fda-plans-help-consumers-capitalize-advances-science
[https://perma.cc/FRJ3-3BGK].
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appropriate, of In Silico trials for advancing new devices and drug therapy
applications.118

These statements reflect U.S. policy in favor of exploring the use of in
silico trials. However, the FDA has not yet issued any guidance, and the
technology remains nascent.119
B. FDA’s Current Regulatory Framework for AI and Devices
The FDA’s thinking about in silico trials seems more advanced in the area
of medical devices. This is because of several factors. First, the FDA already
defines certain kinds of software used in disease detection, diagnosis, or other
medical applications as a regulated “medical device”—SaMD.120 Second,
today’s medical devices are increasingly IoT devices, and like any softwaredependent device, they can be updated remotely. Such updates can be
remedial measures for bugs or security flaws, but a device also can be
designed to respond dynamically to its environment, sending and receiving
performance data and making algorithmically determined adjustments in real
time. The FDA must determine when regulatory approval is required for a
software or software-based update that materially changes a device’s
performance. Finally, since many medical devices are mechanical devices
(such as, for example, hip replacements), the design and performance of
medical devices can be modeled in silico, just as is the case for the myriad of
other things designed using computer-aided design (CAD) software.
Machine learning combined with CAD software could eventually allow the

118. S. REP. NO. 114-82, at 86 (2015).
119. Some observers suggest that the FDA has been slow to implement some of these
priorities because the funding is relatively small, and the agency is understaffed. See, e.g.,
Stephen Barlas, The 21st Century Cures Act: FDA Implementation One Year Later, 43
PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 149, 150 (2018). The FDA has, however, issued guidance on
drug development tools (DDTs), which are “methods, materials, or measures that have the
potential to facilitate drug development,” including, for example, biomarkers, clinical
outcome assessments, and animal models. See Drug Development Tool Qualification
Programs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approvalprocess-drugs/drug-development-tool-qualification-programs [https://perma.cc/R934-THA5]
(last updated June 28, 2019); see also Drug Development Tools: Fit-for-Purpose Initiative,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-processdrugs/drug-development-tools-fit-purpose-initiative [https://perma.cc/T89S-D49L] (last
updated June 28, 2016). DDTs could encompass tools used in AI algorithms. The FDA also
has issued guidance on physiologically based pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic
modeling, which are mathematical models that can be “iteratively modified and updated when
new knowledge in drug and physiology become available.” Program of Physiologically-Based
Pharmacokinetic and Pharmacodynamic Modeling (PBPK Program), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-drug-evaluation-and-research/programphysiologically-based-pharmacokinetic-and-pharmacodynamic-modeling-pbpk-program
[https://perma.cc/4VLR-7UK3] (last updated Sept. 4, 2018). This kind of modeling also is a
good candidate for AI applications.
120. See INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULATORS FORUM, SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE
(SAMD): KEY DEFINITIONS 4 (2013), http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrftech-131209-samd-key-definitions-140901.pdf [https://perma.cc/26PJ-T876].
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computer to make fundamental design decisions.121 The FDA is considering
the extent to which in silico modeling can used to help determine how a
device should be classified or whether it should be approved.
SaMD is defined as “software intended to be used for one or more medical
purposes that perform these purposes without being part of a hardware
medical device.”122 In 2017, the FDA issued a guidance document
incorporating clinical evaluation criteria for SaMD developed by the
International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF).123 The guidance
is organized around the categories of “valid clinical association,” “analytical
validation,” and “clinical validation,” as follows: (1) “Is there a valid clinical
association between your SaMD output and your SaMD’s targeted clinical
condition?”; (2) “Does your SaMD correctly process input data to generate
accurate, reliable, and precise output data?”; and (3) “Does use of your
SaMD’s accurate, reliable, and precise output data achieve your intended
purpose in your target population in the context of clinical care?”124
The guidance document suggests that the SaMD’s performance under each
of these categories may be subject to independent clinical evaluation
depending on the level of risk presented by the SaMD.125
These categories might be relatively easy to apply in relation to traditional
software products that process data according to a fixed program against a
well-defined data range. For example, diagnostic software could be
preprogrammed with known correlations between certain health conditions
and a standard blood chemistry profile test, whereby inputting different
ranges of numbers produces certain results—such as that a phosphorous level
outside a normal range suggests a kidney problem.126
The criteria might be more difficult to apply, however, in relation to
machine learning AI. The expected degree of accuracy, reliability, and
precision will vary as the machine learns, just as it does when a human learns.
Further, the expected degree of accuracy, reliability, and precision may vary
as the problem presented becomes more complex or novel—again, just as
may be the case for a human. Finally, because the AI system changes as it
learns, it creates a never-ending series of iterations of itself that would have
121. See Rachel Gordon, Reshaping Computer-Aided Design, MIT NEWS (July 24, 2017),
http://news.mit.edu/2017/reshaping-computer-aided-design-instantcad-0724
[https://perma.cc/7RVT-QPLF]; Anand Rajagopal et al., The Rise of Machine Learning in
Construction, AUTODESK U., https://www.autodesk.com/autodesk-university/article/Rise-AIand-Machine-Learning-Construction-2018 [https://perma.cc/H2FL-EX7S] (last visited Oct.
6, 2019).
122. Software as a Medical Device (SaMD), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/software-medical-device-samd [https://
perma.cc/28GZ-59KN] (last updated Aug. 31, 2018).
123. See generally FDA, SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD): CLINICAL
EVALUATION; GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/media/100714/download [https://perma.cc/RV85-6A5B] [hereinafter
SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE].
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id.
126. See Phosphorous, AACC: LAB TESTS ONLINE, https://labtestsonline.org/tests/
phosphorus [https://perma.cc/8SLC-WZE6] (last updated Dec. 21, 2018).
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to be tested and retested—yet again, just like a human whose performance
must regularly be reevaluated. AI’s promise exceeds that of traditional
software precisely in its ability to make the kinds of probabilistic, intuitive
leaps associated with human intelligence and to adapt dynamically in
response to new information as humans do.
The IMDRF criteria recognize these possibilities to some extent by
providing for postmarket information gathering but specifically place
“machine learning software” into a different category.127 Building on the
IMDRF criteria, the FDA has promulgated guidelines for when to file a new
510(k) PMN for a software change to an existing device and has developed
a voluntary software precertification program that provides a streamlined
premarket review with ongoing postmarket oversight as the product is refined
through use.128 Under this guidance, the kinds of changes that may require
a new 510(k) include: (1) “[a] change that introduces a new risk or modifies
an existing risk that could result in significant harm”; (2) “[a] change to risk
controls to prevent significant harm; and” (3) “[a] change that significantly
affects clinical functionality or performance specifications of the device.”129
The FDA recognizes that these categories raise questions about AI
applications and accordingly has issued a discussion paper and request for
feedback on how to assess AI applications.130 In the discussion paper, the
FDA notes that “[t]o date, FDA has cleared or approved several AI/MLbased SaMD” that “[t]ypically . . . have only included algorithms that are
‘locked’ prior to marketing, where algorithm changes likely require FDA
premarket review for changes beyond the original market authorization.”131
According to the discussion paper, “[t]he highly iterative, autonomous, and
adaptive nature of [AI/ML] tools requires a new, total product lifecycle
(TPLC) regulatory approach that facilitates a rapid cycle of product
improvement and allows these devices to continually improve while
providing effective safeguards.”132
In the TPLC approach, the FDA’s focus first would be on whether the
applicant’s “culture of quality and organizational excellence” provides
“reasonable assurance of the high quality of [the applicant’s] software
development, testing, and performance monitoring of [its] products.”133 A
127. SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE, supra note 123, at 20.
128. FDA, DECIDING WHEN TO SUBMIT A 510(K) FOR A SOFTWARE CHANGE TO AN EXISTING
DEVICE: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 1 (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/media/99785/download
[https://perma.cc/Z543-TTFX];
FDA,
DEVELOPING A SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM: A WORKING MODEL 18–20 (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/119722/download [https://perma.cc/QY32-5Y48] [hereinafter
DEVELOPING A SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM].
129. FDA, PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MODIFICATIONS TO ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)-BASED SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE
(SAMD): DISCUSSION PAPER AND REQUEST FOR FEEDBACK 3 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/
media/122535/download [https://perma.cc/YPU3-2XNX].
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 7.
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key question here would be whether the applicant uses “Good Machine
Learning Practices (GMLP),” which include practices relating to data
selection and management, model training and tuning, model validation, and
model monitoring with feedback into further model training and tuning.134
The FDA would then examine the AI/ML SaMD as it does other SaMDs,
based on the level of risk presented. For an AI/ML SaMD that requires
premarket review, in addition to the SaMD clinical evaluation criteria, the
applicant could submit a “predetermined change control plan” that would
include “SaMD Pre-Specifications (SPS)” and an “Algorithm Change
Protocol (ACP).”135 The SPS would define a “region of potential changes”
for the device when it is in use, and the ACP would establish specific controls
over data management, retraining objectives and methods, performance
evaluation, and update procedures.136 After initial approval, if changes to
the device are within the SPS and ACP parameters, usually the applicant
would only need to document the changes rather than to file a 510(k).137 In
some cases, the applicant may seek postmarket modifications to the SPS or
ACP without filing a 510(k), while changes materially beyond the SPS or
ACP might require a new 510(k).138 In short, the FDA anticipates a
premarket process for defining a range of possible changes in an AI/ML
SaMD while in use, along with preapproved protocols for how those changes
can occur without requiring a new 510(k).
In addition to SaMD, the FDA also recognizes the potential for
computational modeling to transform the device approval process for
physical devices. It is now common practice to supplement traditional bench,
nonclinical in vivo, and clinical trials with computational models for device
approvals.139 Such computational models can involve, for example, risk
assessments and performance and mechanics simulations in a “virtual”
patient model.140 The FDA has issued guidance on how to report
computational modeling studies as part of a medical device submission,
including detailed guidelines relating to computational fluid dynamics and
mass transport, solid mechanics, electromagnetics and optics, ultrasound, and
134. Id. at 8–9.
135. Id. at 10.
136. Id. at 10–11.
137. Id. at 13–14.
138. Id.
139. See generally, e.g., Tina M. Morrison et al., The Role of Computational Modeling and
Simulation in the Total Product Life Cycle of Peripheral Vascular Devices, HHS PUB. ACCESS
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5823268/pdf/nihms
943392.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ULL-X6XQ].
140. See, e.g., Owen Faris & Jeffrey Shuren, An FDA Viewpoint on Unique Considerations
for Medical-Device Clinical Trials, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1353 (2017) (noting that
“[d]evice manufacturers are increasingly developing stochastic engineering models that may
have the capability to simulate clinical outcomes for ‘virtual patients’ by modeling a
relationship between bench outcomes and clinical endpoints”). For an example of such a
virtual patient model, see Simulia Living Heart: Advancing Cardiovascular Science with
Realistic
Simulation,
DASSAULT
SYSTÈMES,
https://www.3ds.com/productsservices/simulia/solutions/life-sciences/living-heart-human-model/ [https://perma.cc/2CFHZQS4] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
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heat transfer.141 It also has worked with the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers to develop a standard for assessing the credibility of such
computational models.142
Although computational modeling is common for medical devices,
however, the technology and its use for regulatory purposes is only beginning
to show its potential, particularly as augmented by AI. As Dr. Tina Morrison,
deputy director of the Division of Applied Mechanics in the FDA’s Office of
Science and Engineering Laboratories, noted in a recent paper, under a
product lifecycle management approach, the medical device industry could
“more fully harness the power of simulation in each phase of the product’s
lifecycle and utilize AI tools to implement knowledge gained from real-world
data to enhance their understanding of performance, support continuous
improvement, and inform new designs and therapies.”143 Further, Deputy
Director Morrison said, the “FDA also believes that computational modeling
is poised to become a critical tool for accelerating regulatory decisionmaking.”144
C. Proposals for the Near Future (Five to Twenty Years)
1. Regulatory Approval Pathways
As the discussion above shows, the FDA is ahead of the game in creating
guidance relating to AI and medical devices, including SaMD, but seems to
be behind concerning drugs, biologics, and genetic therapies—despite
expressions of support for in silico trials for drugs. This is largely because
the IoMT is already here, while the high-throughput screening methods used
by pharmaceutical companies today operate prior to filing for regulatory
approvals and the technology for in silico drug trials remains nascent at best.
It seems easy to suggest that the FDA should prepare to move as rapidly
concerning in silico drug and biologic trials as it has for AI in devices. The
regulatory category of “devices,” however, is much broader than drugs or
biologics, as the different classes of devices in the regulations suggest. The
public health consequences of device malfunctions can be easier to predict
and constrain with many kinds of devices than many kinds of drugs. For
biologics and genetic therapies, the public health risks can be even broader,
particularly if a genetic change becomes inheritable. This suggests that
regulatory caution is appropriate until the technology develops. Two areas
ripe for further regulatory development are privacy and security.
141. See generally FDA, REPORTING OF COMPUTATIONAL MODELING STUDIES IN MEDICAL
DEVICE SUBMISSIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF
(2016), https://www.fda.gov/media/87586/download [https://perma.cc/34Q2-TNX5].
142. See generally ASME, ASSESSING CREDIBILITY OF COMPUTATIONAL MODELING AND
SIMULATION RESULTS THROUGH VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION: APPLICATION TO MEDICAL
DEVICES (2018); FDA, supra note 141.
143. Tina M. Morrison et al., Advancing Regulatory Science with Computational Modeling
for Medical Devices at the FDA’s Office of Science and Engineering Laboratories, FRONTIERS
MED., Sept. 2018, at 1, 8.
144. Id.
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2. Privacy and Security Requirements at the FDA?
The FDA’s Software Precertification Program requires the manufacturer
to demonstrate “excellence in protecting cybersecurity and proactively
addressing cybersecurity issues through active engagement with stakeholders
and peers.”145 This program cross-references an IMDRF standard146 and a
2016 FDA guidance document on cybersecurity to flesh out this
requirement.147
The IMDRF standard notes that security analysis can include “intrusion
detection, penetration testing, vulnerability scanning, and data integrity
testing” but also states that “the manufacturer should ensure that security risk
controls do not take precedence over safety considerations.”148 It provides
no further detail about how these goals should be accomplished.
The FDA “Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices”
guidance provides a framework for distinguishing routine software updates
and patches for cybersecurity purposes from device changes that need to be
reported to the FDA.149 This guidance also recommends that manufacturers
participate in an “Information Sharing Analysis Organization” and utilize the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) “Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”150 The NIST framework
is widely recognized as a gold standard for cybersecurity compliance.151 The
FDA has also issued guidance on premarket submissions for management of
cybersecurity in medical devices, which likewise refer to controls in the
NIST framework, as well as an earlier guidance document on cybersecurity
for networked devices containing off the shelf software such as database
programs.152
While the FDA has emphasized cybersecurity in medical devices, it has
not issued any guidance on privacy. The FDA’s guidance on postmarket
management of cybersecurity in medical devices suggests that privacy issues
are addressed under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
145. DEVELOPING A SOFTWARE PRECERTIFICATION PROGRAM, supra note 128, at 11.
146. See id. at 18.
147. See id. at 39. See generally FDA, POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN
MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF
(2016), https://www.fda.gov/media/95862/download [https://perma.cc/UQ8T-6HTN].
148. INT’L MED. DEVICE REGULATORS FORUM, SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD):
APPLICATION OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 14 (2015), http://www.imdrf.org/docs/
imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-151002-samd-qms.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV3U-LPC9].
149. FDA, supra note 147, at 9–10.
150. Id. at 7, 14.
151. See generally Cybersecurity Framework, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework [https://perma.cc/DD6X-2LPC] (last visited Oct. 6,
2019).
152. FDA, CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY
IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF
(2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/86174/download [https://perma.cc/7RNZ-VR7D]; FDA,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CYBERSECURITY FOR NETWORKED MEDICAL DEVICES CONTAINING
OFF-THE-SHELF (OTS) SOFTWARE (2005), https://www.fda.gov/media/72154/download
[https://perma.cc/K2RE-NH4G].

2019]

AI IN DRUGS, BIOLOGICS, AND MEDICAL DEVICES

577

as administered by the Department of Health and Human Services Office for
Civil Rights.153 This represents a regulatory silo problem that should be
addressed in relation to security, privacy, and AI in medical devices.154
Privacy and security are intimately related. Devices that lack adequate
privacy safeguards are less secure and more susceptible to exploitation,
including exploitation that comprises safety and effectiveness. The FDA’s
guidances on SaMD and AI therefore should include a recommendation that
manufacturers employ “privacy by design” principles.155
The connection between privacy, security, and safety and efficacy is
particularly dynamic and difficult in relation to AI systems, even more so for
systems that exchange information with a government agency.156 This was
illustrated in 2017, for example, by the controversy over whether the
DeepMind partnership with the Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust,
which allowed Google to access patient data in a trial of a kidney disease
detection app, violated the United Kingdom’s 1998 Data Protection Act.157
As a 2018 report by the influential AI Now Institute notes, “[t]he
implementation of AI systems is expanding rapidly, without adequate
governance, oversight, or accountability regimes,” and “[w]e need a sectorspecific approach that does not prioritize the technology, but focuses on its
application within a given domain.”158 As the regulator with most immediate
oversight over drugs and medical devices, the FDA should not simply defer
privacy regulation to the Department of Health and Human Services or the
Federal Trade Commission.
153. See FDA, supra note 147, at 10–11.
154. Cf. Theodore T. Lee, Recommendations for Regulating Software-Based Medical
Treatments: Learning from Therapies for Psychiatric Conditions, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 66,
87–91 (2018) (discussing “regulatory fragmentation” relating to mobile medical apps);
Nicolas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data Protection, 17
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 146, 146–48 (2017) (discussing regulatory silos and
regulatory arbitrage in relation to health data protection).
155. See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
BUSINESSES
AND
POLICYMAKERS
22–34
(2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KF2M-UL8N]; Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational
Principles, IAPP, https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Privacy%20by%20Design%20%207%20Foundational%20Principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y29W-5NA2] (last visited Oct.
6, 2019); Privacy by Design: Setting a New Standard for Privacy Certification, DELOITTE,
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ca/Documents/risk/ca-en-ers-privacy-bydesign-brochure.PDF [https://perma.cc/7HJX-2E6C] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
156. See Nicolas P. Terry, Appification, AI, and Healthcare’s New Iron Triangle, 20 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 117, 157–59 (2018).
157. See Letter from Elizabeth Denham, U.K. Info. Comm’r, to Sir David Sloman, Chief
Exec., Royal Free London NHS Found. Tr. (July 3, 2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/actionweve-taken/undertakings/2014353/undertaking-cover-letter-revised-04072017-to-firstperson.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GYN-QLJ6]. But see LINKLATERS LLP, AUDIT OF THE ACUTE
KIDNEY INJURY DETECTION SYSTEM KNOWN AS STREAMS 36–39 (2018), http://s3-eu-west1.amazonaws.com/files.royalfree.nhs.uk/Reporting/Streams_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
L3K2-ZM96].
158. MEREDITH WHITTAKER ET AL., AI NOW INST., AI NOW REPORT 2018, at 4 (2018),
https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2018_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQJ6-7KKR].
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3. Virtual Patient Models
As noted in Part II.B above, one of the most promising developments in
predictive analytics for drugs and devices is in the use of “virtual patient”
models for in silico trials, and the FDA has already issued guidance on
employing such models in device approvals.159 A “virtual patient” model
uses data analytics to simulate an organ or system in the human body, such
as the heart.160 A researcher can analyze, and with some models even
visualize in three dimensions, the predicted effects of an action such as the
introduction of a drug or medical device to the body.161 Sophisticated models
use forms of AI to predict how the system will change over time.
The FDA guidance recommends that applicants submit information that
validates the computer model, such as an in vivo, ex vivo, or in vitro
comparator or test data.162 There is no other guidance on the source,
ownership, or use of model data. This is another area in which the FDA
should provide further guidance.
Concerning the source of data for virtual patient models, the FDA should
distinguish different kinds of models and note issues that can arise from
biases in the selection of training data in AI models. A model of an organ
such as the heart seems less problematic regarding potential algorithmic bias.
Besides exceptional cases in which a patient is kept alive with an artificial
heart, every living human has a heart, and the organ has a well-known and
relatively limited set of functional parameters.163 Imagine, instead, a much
more sophisticated model of parts of the nervous system used to test the
effects of an antidepressant or other psychotropic drug on substance abuse
and addiction. Addiction is both a social and a biological problem with many
risk factors, so training data that draws from too narrow a demographic could
skew the model’s predictions of the drug’s safety and efficacy.164
Concerning ownership and use of model data, the FDA should note a
preference for open-source/open-access models.165 Ideally, the FDA would
159. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Mark Nicholls, A 3D Virtual Heart Tool, 37 EUR. HEART J. 2813, 2813
(2016); The Living Heart Project: A Translational Research Initiative to Revolutionize
Cardiovascular Science Through Realistic Simulation, DASSAULT SYSTÈMES, https://
www.3ds.com/products-services/simulia/solutions/life-sciences/the-living-heart-project/
[https://perma.cc/6W34-4VX8] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
161. See The Living Heart Project, supra note 160.
162. FDA, supra note 142, at 6.
163. For an example of a patient kept alive for an extended period on an artificial heart, see
Kevin Joy, Living for Years Without a Heart Is Now Possible, MICH. HEALTH (Sept. 6, 2016,
7:00 AM), https://healthblog.uofmhealth.org/heart-health/living-for-years-without-a-heartnow-possible [https://perma.cc/GP6U-VZ5N].
164. See generally, e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
TREATMENT FOR STIMULANT USE DISORDERS (1999), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
NBK64328/ [https://perma.cc/9F8C-EG8U].
165. By “open source,” I mean that the source code for the model is available for
modification by the user and developer community under a viral license. See generally David
W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 18 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 167 (2004). By “open access,” I mean available to the public free of direct charge
and with minimal transaction costs, with or without a viral license. See David W. Opderbeck,
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require that virtual patient models be open source and open access, but this
could sit beyond the FDA’s current regulatory authority and might require
changes to intellectual property law. The question is important, however,
because control over virtual patient models could significantly impact public
health outcomes and health-care costs.
Presently there are no intellectual property–related transaction costs to
obtaining human test subjects for clinical trials required for FDA approval of
drugs, biologics, or devices, and access to such test subjects is not controlled
by any private entity. Instead, access to human test subjects is governed by
ethical and legal rules, including rules focused on the informed consent of
the subject.166 This means that human clinical trials ultimately entail at least
some level of legal accountability grounded in medical ethics and science.
This democratic ideal, of course, is compromised by the expense and
complexity of running a well-designed clinical trial, which is why
manufacturers often turn to clinical research organizations (CROs) to design
and run clinical trials.167 But neither the pharmaceutical companies nor the
CROs own the test subjects they recruit and they cannot restrict other CROs
from running clinical trials, whether on the same product or on other
products.
Imagine, instead, that a private company owns the intellectual property in
a proprietary virtual patient model. This intellectual property could include
method patents relating to the modeling as well as a copyright in the model’s
computer code. The owner of this intellectual property could collect a license
fee every time the model is used or could refuse to license the model for
certain uses.
In some ways the potential economic and ethical problems raised by this
hypothetical resemble issues arising from the “Oncomouse” and other kinds
of genetically engineered and traditional research tools.168 Concerning those
technologies, the policy in the United States and in Europe is generally to
leave cost and access issues to the market. In fact, the prospect of intellectual
property protection over a valuable research tool in an otherwise lightly
regulated market provides an incentive for someone to invest in developing

The Penguin’s Paradox: The Political Economy of International Intellectual Property and
the Paradox of Open Intellectual Property Models, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 104 (2007).
166. See Informed Consent for Clinical Trials, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/clinical-trials-what-patients-need-know/informed-consentclinical-trials [https://perma.cc/8LL9-85KH] (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).
167. See, e.g., Allie Nawrat, Ranking the Top Ten Clinical Research Organisations in the
World, PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.pharmaceuticaltechnology.com/features/top-ten-clinical-research-organisations/
[https://perma.cc/QX67WE5S].
168. See generally Jerry Adler, The First Patented Animal Is Still Leading the Way on
Cancer Research, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/
smithsonian-institution/first-patented-animal-still-leading-way-cancer-research-180961149/
[https://perma.cc/9Q4W-GNRE]; Michael B. Dilling & Terese L. Rakow, Licensing
Transgenic Mice and Other Research Tools: A Practical Guide, in 4 AUTM TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER PRACTICE MANUAL (3d ed. 2010), https://www.autm.net/AUTMMain/media/
ThirdEditionPDFs/V4/TTP_V4_ResearchTools.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3M7-8EZ7].
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the tool. The social cost of the intellectual property right is the price paid to
incentivize innovation.
Human virtual patient models seem different, however, because ownership
of these kinds of models suggests ownership of human characteristics that
should remain the common property of humanity. The policy issues here
resemble those raised by Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc.,169 where the Supreme Court struck down a patent on naturally
occurring genetic markers. The Myriad Court, however, held that synthetic
DNA could be patentable.170 Further, Myriad had nothing to do with
copyright in computer code. Although the copyright “idea/expression”
dichotomy is analogous to the “product of nature” doctrine in patent law,
code that represents a biological model is easily distinguishable from the idea
of the model and usually should be copyrightable.171 Existing intellectual
property law would ordinarily allow patents and copyrights relating to human
virtual patient models.172
Currently the FDA maintains a repository of data, models, and software
developed by government employees and therefore not protected by
intellectual property rights.173 At least in one instance, however, the FDA
has encouraged a private company to develop a virtual “living heart” model
by entering into a five-year agreement to develop testing parameters for
cardiovascular devices using the model.174 Although this kind of partnership
can encourage innovation, it also raises difficult questions about the use of
public resources for basic research platforms that will be controlled by
private entities.
One possible approach for addressing this kind of issue is the NIH’s Public
Access Policy, which requires that publications resulting from NIH funding
be placed into the PubMed Central database no later than twelve months after
the official date of publication in a peer-reviewed journal.175 The FDA could
require that virtual patient models used for in silico trials that support a drug,
biologic, or device approval be placed into an open-source repository upon
marketing approval of the drug, biologic, or device.
This would not destroy the incentives for private entities to develop such
models because there is significant lead time between the use of a novel
model and a product approval and because, as with the NIH’s Public Access
169. 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
170. Id. at 594–95.
171. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
172. See id.
173. Public Domain Data, Modeling, and Software, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/cdrh-offices/public-domain-data-modeling-and-software
[https://perma.cc/5AVF-8V5V] (last updated Nov. 13, 2017).
174. Kellen Owings, Dassault Systèmes, FDA Collaborate on Living Heart Project, FDA
NEWS (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.fdanews.com/articles/168507-dassault-systmes-fdacollaborate-on-living-heart-project [https://perma.cc/PL4Z-FHLU].
175. See NIH Public Access Policy Details, NIH PUB. ACCESS POL’Y,
https://publicaccess.nih.gov/policy.htm [https://perma.cc/QP9P-5CHF] (last updated Mar. 25,
2016); When and How to Comply, NIH PUB. ACCESS POL’Y, https://publicaccess.nih.gov/
[https://perma.cc/Q9DA-9EF8] (last updated Mar. 18, 2014).
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Policy, a deposit in an open-source/open-access repository does not divest
the author of copyright.176 Open-source/open-access deposits effectively
amount to compulsory licenses for the repository to copy and distribute the
work and, for users of the repository at least, to make such copies as are
required to use the repository.177 However, mere access to a copyrighted
work in an open-source/open-access repository does not authorize the user to
make further copies or to further distribute the work. In the case of a software
model, a “copy” is made whenever the source code is loaded into memory,
so an end user would still need a license to run the code.178
At the same time, publication would allow follow-on innovators to
examine the source code to design around elements of the program that might
be protected by copyright, appropriate elements of the program that are not
copyrightable or in the public domain, or negotiate licenses for refinements
or add-ons that would constitute derivative works.179 Publication would also
facilitate transparency and accountability. The public, including watchdog
groups and academic researchers, should have full access to the source code
for any models used as the basis of public health regulatory decisions.
D. Proposals for the Longer Term (Twenty to Thirty Years)
The convergence of drugs, biologics, genetics, AI, and medical devices
will likely accelerate rapidly over the next twenty to thirty years. Consider
nanoscale devices that can create images and deliver drugs within individual
cells.180 Such devices can be linked with machine learning systems to run
diagnostic tests at the cellular and even molecular level.181 These systems
will learn from the wealth of information being generated by “omics”
research—the use of high-throughput technologies to identify associations
across entire genomes, proteomes, metabolomes, epigenomes,
transcriptomes, and microbiomes.182 Some researchers are even theorizing
about a “human brain/cloud interface,” which they describe as a “stable,
secure, real-time system . . . for interfacing the cloud with the human
brain.”183
176.
177.
178.
179.

Cf. NIH Public Access Policy Details, supra note 175.
See id.
See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993).
For a general discussion of software copyright, see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.10 (rev. ed. 2019).
180. See, e.g., Dhruba J. Bharali et al., Nanoparticles and Cancer Therapy: A Concise
Review with Emphasis on Dendrimers, 4 INT’L J. NANOMEDICINE 1, 2 (2009); Carolyn L. Waite
& Charles M. Roth, Nanoscale Drug Delivery Systems for Enhanced Drug Penetration into
Solid Tumors: Current Progress and Opportunities, 40 CRITICAL REV. BIOMEDICAL
ENGINEERING 21, 22 (2012).
181. See generally G. M. Sacha & P. Varona, Artificial Intelligence in Nanotechnology,
NANOTECHNOLOGY, Oct. 2013, at 1; Liam Critchley, The Convergence of AI and
Nanotechnology, NANO MAG. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://nano-magazine.com/news/2018/8/22/
the-convergence-of-ai-and-nanotechnology [https://perma.cc/L9QC-X6CA].
182. See generally Yehudit Hasin et al., Multi-omics Approaches to Disease, GENOME
BIOLOGY, May 5, 2017, at 1.
183. Nuno R. B. Martins et al., Human Brain/Cloud Interface, FRONTIERS MED., Mar. 2019,
at 1, 1.
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1. Regulatory Pathways
These hybrid systems will challenge the current regulatory distinctions
between drugs, biologics, and devices. For example, the FDA has issued a
guidance document on nanotechnology, which notes that “nanotechnology
may result in product attributes that differ from those of conventionallymanufactured products, and thus may merit particular examination” but that
the FDA “does not categorically judge all products that involve the
application of nanotechnology as intrinsically benign or harmful.”184
Another draft guidance document suggests considerations regarding
nanomaterials in drug products, including possible unique issues arising from
the physical structure and administration of such materials.185 No current or
draft guidance directly discusses the coming convergence of nanotechnology
and AI, which might result in a swarm of microscopic, autonomously
controlled devices within the body. As these technologies mature and
converge, the FDA may need to consider new regulatory categories, or
Congress may need to create such categories.
2. Privacy
In addition to new regulatory pathways, the acceleration of omics research
and the convergence of drugs, devices, and AI will require even more careful
thought about privacy, accountability, and access beyond the FDA’s remit.
The current minimalist, sector-specific approach to federal privacy
regulation in the United States is inadequate to the task. We will require a
more comprehensive data privacy and security regime such as the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).186
Some provisions of the GDPR, however, will be difficult to apply to AI
systems, so the United States should not simply adopt a carbon copy of the
GDPR. For example, Article 22 of the GDPR states that a person has the
right “not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing,
including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or
similarly significantly affects him or her” without the subject’s “explicit
consent” or in some other limited circumstances.187 The European
Commission has stressed that this provision applies to AI systems.188
184. FDA, CONSIDERING WHETHER AN FDA-REGULATED PRODUCT INVOLVES THE
APPLICATION OF NANOTECHNOLOGY:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 4 (2014), https://
www.fda.gov/media/88423/download [https://perma.cc/ZEG5-LJQN].
185. FDA, DRUG PRODUCTS, INCLUDING BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS, THAT CONTAIN
NANOMATERIALS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/109910/
download [https://perma.cc/PW5Z-C777].
186. See generally Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General
Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
187. Id. at 46.
188. See Artificial Intelligence for Europe, § 3.3, COM (2018) 237 final (Apr. 25, 2018)
(stating that “[t]he Commission will closely follow the Regulation’s application in the context
of AI and calls on the national data protection authorities and the European Data Protection
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Although consent is the most obvious exception to this prohibition, it is
difficult to know what “explicit consent” might mean in connection with
something like a nanoscale drug delivery system that is actively learning and
changing as it fights a disease.189
In addition, Articles 13 and 15 of the GDPR both state that an individual
is entitled to “meaningful information about the logic involved,” as well as
“the significance and the envisaged consequences” of the processing of the
subject’s data, which some commentators suggest gives data subjects a “right
of explainability” of how an AI model works.190 Some kind of right of
explainability is important, but its parameters need to be specified,
particularly in relation to a system that directly affects the body. Further, it
is unclear whether the GDPR’s provisions regarding the data subject’s right
to revoke consent and obtain the return of their data means that an AI system
must be retrained without a subject’s data if that subject originally consented
to the use of his or her data but later revokes consent.191 Finally, it is unclear
whether the right of rectification and the right to be forgotten relate to a
subject’s data within an AI system.192 These kinds of provisions would need
to be clarified if the United States were to adopt a GDPR-like model.
3. Intellectual Property
AI will begin to challenge intellectual property paradigms in
pharmaceuticals and medical devices as well as privacy paradigms. As
therapies become more personalized based on what a predictive analytics
Board to do the same”); see also Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on
Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation
2016/679, at 20–21, WP251rev.01 (Oct. 3, 2017), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/
W29-auto-decision_profiling_02-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZS8-H69N].
189. See Andrew Burt, How Will the GDPR Impact Machine Learning?, O’REILLY (May
16,
2018),
https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/how-will-the-gdpr-impact-machine-learning
[https://perma.cc/NW9U-PUEG].
190. See id.; Andrew Burt, Is There a ‘Right to Explanation’ for Machine Learning in the
GDPR?, IAPP (June 1, 2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/is-there-a-right-to-explanation-formachine-learning-in-the-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/EQW3-VXTB]. But see generally Sandra
Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in
the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76 (2017).
191. In a recent opinion on clinical trials and the GDPR, the European Data Protection
Board stated that:
Under the GDPR, if consent is used as the lawful basis for processing, there must
be a possibility for individuals to withdraw that consent at any time (Article 7(3)),
and there is no exception to this requirement for scientific research. As a general
rule, if consent is withdrawn, all data processing operations that were based on
consent remain lawful in accordance with the GDPR (Article 7(3)); however, the
controller shall stop the processing actions concerned and if there is no other lawful
basis justifying the retention for further processing, the data should be deleted by
the controller (see Article 17(1)(b) and (3) GDPR).
European Data Prot. Bd., Opinion 3/2019 Concerning the Questions and Answers on the
Interplay Between the Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR) and the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) (art. 70.1.b) 6–7 (Jan. 23, 2019), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/
files/files/file1/edpb_opinionctrq_a_final_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BMT-BYEU] (footnote
omitted).
192. See GDPR, supra note 186, at 36–37, 43–44; Burt, supra note 189.
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system says about an individual patient’s genome, for example, compared to
known variations, the patent-based blockbuster pharmaceutical model will
begin to diminish. The intellectual property in the AI system will start to
become as important as the intellectual property in the chemical formula of
a drug. The convergence of drugs, biologics, and devices will accelerate this
trend. The medical device market is already so diverse and segmented, and
the pace of change so rapid, that the blockbuster drug model centered on a
single unique patented formula does not apply in the same way as for
drugs.193 The biologics market is growing rapidly, but the complexity of
biologic molecules and the law restricting the patentability of naturally
occurring genetic sequences could limit the extent to which a drug-like
blockbuster cycle develops.194 Even with drugs, if high-throughput
screening and in silico trials significantly reduce the time and expense of
finding suitable drug candidates, the blockbuster model should further
fracture. These market dynamics in relation to intellectual property mean
that pharmaceuticals and medical devices will start to look like Silicon Valley
industries as much as traditional life science industries. Indeed, as Google’s
acquisition of DeepMind shows, Silicon Valley is eager to enter this space.195
From an intellectual property policy perspective, this dynamic will raise
some difficult challenges. Patents are important in the AI space. As a recent
World Intellectual Property Organization report notes, “50 percent of all AI
patents have been published in just the last five years—a remarkable
illustration of how rapidly innovation is advancing in this field.”196 The
importance of drug patents to public health prompted the adjustments found
in the Hatch-Waxman Act, including the ability of generic manufacturers to
challenge drug patents without incurring the risk of damages.197 A related,
though more complicated, mechanism was adopted as part of the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009.198 It is unclear whether a
similar procedure should exist for AI patents that would apply to drugs,
biologics, or devices, but we should begin having the conversation,
particularly concerning AI-based SaMD or devices incorporating AI
approved by the FDA.
193. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 207–35 (2017), http://www.medpac.gov/docs/
default-source/reports/jun17_reporttocongress_sec.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6DQ-PDYL].
194. See Nicola Davies, The Future of Biologics, PHARMA LETTER (Apr. 17, 2017), https://
www.thepharmaletter.com/article/the-future-of-biologics
[https://perma.cc/6CJ9-AYHZ].
Cf. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1046–47 (2016).
195. See DEEPMIND, supra note 105.
196. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 2019: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 7 (2019), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_1055.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PB25-72M9].
197. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.). The Hatch-Waxman framework, of course, has not been without controversy. See
generally David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements
in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303 (2010).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012).
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Even more troubling, because AI is constructed with software code,
copyright law also will apply. Presently there are debates about whether
works created by an AI without direct human input can qualify for copyright
protection, and the answer to that question so far seems to be no, although
the law is unsettled.199 There is no doubt, however, that the human-made
code and algorithms that comprise the baseline AI system are copyrightable
just like any computer code.200
Copyrights last longer and are harder to challenge than patents. Patents
generally last twenty years from the date of the patent application and can be
challenged if they are not novel or nonobvious over the prior art, as well as
on other technical grounds.201 Copyrights in the United States last for the
life of the author plus seventy years or, for works made for hire, for ninetyfive years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever
expires first.202 Access to AI systems also can be protected by technological
measures such as encryption, which invokes the anticircumvention
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.203 The notion that a
system being developed today could become vital to public health and might
be controlled under copyright and paracopyright by a private commercial
entity well into the next century is frightening. We need to consider a
compulsory licensing mechanism for AI copyrights that become vital to
public health.204
Finally, AI technology can be protected by trade secret law. A company
might choose to patent some parts of its AI technology and to keep other
parts secret.205 While a patent disclosure destroys a trade secret claim for
anything disclosed in the patent, copyright does not require public disclosure.
Copyright protection subsists without registration, and even if registration is
sought, the applicant can deposit software code without disclosing trade
secrets.206 Trade secrecy in the initial AI code compounds the “black box”
problem—the fact that, once an AI system begins learning, it can become

199. See, e.g., Andres Guadamuz, Artificial Intelligence and Copyright, WIPO MAG. (Oct.
2017), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/05/article_0003.html [https://perma.cc/
D74P-T8J4].
200. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF COMPUTER
PROGRAMS (2017), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ61.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MHBNUB2].
201. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
202. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). These terms are for works created on or after January 1,
1978. Id. For works created before that date, the term is different and is based on the details
of publication and renewal under the Copyright Act of 1909. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 303–05 (2012).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
204. Cf. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299.
205. For a discussion of the relationship between patents and trade secrets, see generally
David W. Opderbeck, Social Network Analysis of Trade Secrets and Patents as Social
Relations, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 355 (2013).
206. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 200, at 3–4.
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difficult or even impossible to determine the basis for its decisions.207 As
noted above, current FDA draft guidance states that “good machine learning
practices” require the explainability of results, and the European Union’s
GDPR also appears to contain a “right of explainability.”208 Whether
through the FDA or otherwise, we should consider rules that require public
disclosure notwithstanding trade secret claims when an AI system is critical
to public health.
E. AI Enabled Drugs and Devices: 2050
How will AI impact health care by the year 2050? In their book The
Second Machine Age, Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee argue that
computing technologies such as AI will continue to improve logarithmically
and that the “second half of the chessboard” will bring both dramatic
increases in overall prosperity and dramatic increases in the “spread”
between the poor and the well-off.209 Of course, no one knows if Moore’s
Law will continue to hold, never mind how war, pandemic, climate change,
or other disasters might impact the future, but let us assume for a moment
that Brynjolfsson and McAfee are at least partly correct.210
One possibility is that AI will become smarter than humans, perhaps even
self-aware, and it will be impossible for humans to control the AI
“singularity.”211 If that is the case, there is little that can be done to plan for
it, and it likely will either comprise an unprecedented boon or an apocalyptic
disaster for humanity. Most AI scientists, however, do not believe an AI
“singularity” is likely any time in the next century, if ever.212
Hype about the “singularity” aside, it is possible that by 2050 the available
volume of global health data collected through connected devices and other
sensors together with more powerful algorithms could provide
comprehensive and accurate predictions about what kinds of research
programs and technological investments would yield the most benefits with
the least costs in terms of global public health.213 At the same time, advances
in AI and other technologies will facilitate not only health remediation and
disease prevention but also human enhancement assisted by predictive
207. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
208. See supra notes 129, 186 and accompanying text.
209. ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK,
PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 6–12 (2014).
210. Your correspondent will be eighty-two and hopes he will look back fondly on the time
when he wrote this Essay.
211. See Jolene Creighton, The ‘Father of Artificial Intelligence’ Says Singularity Is 30
Years Away, FUTURISM (Feb. 14, 2018), https://futurism.com/father-artificial-intelligencesingularity-decades-away [https://perma.cc/S4TG-VDN3].
212. See Branko Blagojevic, AI, Optimists vs Pessimists and Why the Singularity Isn’t
Near, MEDIUM (Oct. 8, 2018), https://medium.com/ml-everything/ai-optimists-vs-pessimistsand-why-the-singularity-isnt-near-5d3a614dbd45 [https://perma.cc/988Q-KZ24].
213. See A Digital Revolution in Health Care Is Speeding Up, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/business/2017/03/02/a-digital-revolution-in-health-care-isspeeding-up [https://perma.cc/3ZMB-C7CE].
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algorithms about the future risks and benefits of such enhancements.214
These prospects should challenge our current economic paradigm for drug
and device development.
One of the proposed moral justifications advanced for leaving most
applied drug and device research to private markets is that consumer demand
is a better proxy for public health needs than centralized government
planning.215 There are of course some good and well-known reasons for this
belief:
resource limitations, agency costs, corruption, and other
inefficiencies can impair regulatory resource allocations, while markets are
supposed to be self-correcting.216 Even so, there is no such thing as a truly
free, efficient market for health care, including drugs and medical devices.217
In particular, for drugs, price elasticity of demand rather than global public
health needs determines where resources are invested and who has access to
treatment.218 Given the global public health burden of diseases such as
malaria and tuberculosis, which mostly affect poor parts of the world, the
moral case is tenuous at best.219 Nevertheless, given the enormous sunk costs
of drug development and the limits of existing predictive models, there is
some moral justification for a privatized pharmaceutical industry founded on
patents.
If AI both brings development costs down and increases the accuracy of
public health outcome predictions, however, that justification may evaporate.
At the same time, as noted above, intellectual property rights in AI systems
could further cement the capacity of a small number of large private
technology companies to direct the course of public health policy. If we
believe health care really is a human right, we should seize the present
opportunity to imagine a world in which AI enables more equitable access to
treatments rather than furthering the divide between rich and poor.
Many AI theorists recognize that over the long term, AI will raise these
sorts of big questions about global equity. The highly regarded “Asilomar
AI Principles,” for example, state that “AI technologies should benefit and
empower as many people as possible,” “[t]he economic prosperity created by
AI should be shared broadly, to benefit all of humanity,” and
“[s]uperintelligence should only be developed in the service of widely shared
ethical ideals, and for the benefit of all humanity rather than one state or
214. See Jolene Creighton, World Leaders Have Decided: The Next Step in AI Is
Augmenting Humans, FUTURISM (Feb. 10, 2018), https://futurism.com/ai-augmenting-humans
[https://perma.cc/U4XZ-EUAM]; Nicholas Thompson, Will Artificial Intelligence Enhance or
Hack Humanity?, WIRED (Apr. 28, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/willartificial-intelligence-enhance-hack-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/E7HA-RLFK].
215. See generally James Capretta & Kevin Dayaratna, Compelling Evidence Makes the
Case for a Market-Driven Health Care System, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 20, 2013),
https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/compelling-evidence-makes-the-casemarket-driven-health-care-system [https://perma.cc/8UET-ZJQ5].
216. See id.
217. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963).
218. See Opderbeck, supra note 77, at 508–09, 525–29.
219. See id. at 503.
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organization.”220 A recent report, “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI,”
prepared by an independent working group of the European Commission
similarly suggests that “[t]he development, deployment, and use of AI
systems must be fair,” including “equal and just distribution of both benefits
and costs.”221 These remain high-level exhortations, however, with little
concrete reflection on how they might apply to specific sectors such as
pharmaceuticals and medical devices.
Indeed, such statements about distributive justice sit in some tension with
current governmental policies designed to promote the growth of private AI
industries.
The European Commission’s communication “Artificial
Intelligence for Europe,” for example, focuses at least as much on developing
a private European AI industry as on ethical principles.222 In the United
States, the first line of President Trump’s February 11, 2019 executive order
entitled “Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence” states
that “Artificial Intelligence (AI) promises to drive growth of the United
States economy, enhance our economic and national security, and improve
our quality of life.”223 At the same time, both the European Union and the
United States have begun work on programs to open public sector
information for use in AI health-care research, framed not only in terms of
public health but also in terms of boosting the health-care industry sector.224
Although the prospect seems politically impossible in our current
environment, this suggests that a conversation about AI in drug and medical
device development should happen at the international level. In 1994, the
World Trade Organization’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS) treaty encoded minimum standards for national patent laws that
strongly favored multinational pharmaceutical companies in the United
States and Europe, to the detriment of the global South, and specifically
responded to the growing generic industry in India.225 Only later were
compulsory licensing provisions for the benefit of developing countries
clarified, and those provisions have largely proved too clumsy and
complicated to be useful.226 While there has been discussion of the risks of
“AI arms proliferation” and of an “AI arms treaty,” there has been little

220. Asilomar AI Principles, supra note 114.
221. High-Level Expert Grp. on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy
AI, at 12 (Apr. 8, 2019) (EU), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm
?doc_id=60419 [https://perma.cc/Q3B7-AE6E].
222. See generally Artificial Intelligence for Europe, supra note 188.
223. Exec. Order No. 13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019).
224. See generally Artificial Intelligence in Europe, supra note 188; Artificial Intelligence
for the American People, WHITE HOUSE (May 10, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/artificial-intelligence-american-people/ [https://perma.cc/FPQ9-T26V].
225. See Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS
Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1571–72 (2009);
Opderbeck, supra note 77, at 506–07.
226. See Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/3TB9-2LFG] (last updated Mar. 2018).
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discussion of an AI health or intellectual property treaty.227 That discussion
should begin in earnest. At the very least, such a treaty should provide
minimum standards for compulsory licenses on intellectual property in AI
for pharmaceutical and medical products and should include clear exceptions
to intellectual property and related technological anticircumvention rights in
such products for public health research.
CONCLUSION
AI is already impacting the development and function of drugs, biologics,
and medical devices. The trend towards convergence of these products,
assisted by AI, will accelerate rapidly in coming years. In the United States,
the FDA already has taken important steps toward incorporating in silico
trials and evaluating the use of AI in SaMD and other medical devices. The
FDA could do more, however, to ensure that AI in pharmaceuticals and
medical devices reflect “privacy by design” principles and is accessible
through open-source and open-access publishing models. Over the coming
decades, AI could significantly disrupt the already fragile blockbuster model
of pharmaceutical development and shift the drug, biotech, and medical
device industries away from their life sciences roots and toward Silicon
Valley. Congress should consider new regulatory models to address the
related intellectual property, privacy, and accountability issues these changes
will entail. By 2050, even aside from an unlikely AI “singularity,” advances
in AI could herald a new era in which goals of distributive justice relating to
global public health could be more fully realized—if public policy prompts
a shift away from entrenched intellectual property models that could increase
current disparities in health care between rich and poor. Over the longer
term, we need a new international AI treaty regime that accounts for public
health values.
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